Evaluation of a sample of Consumer Enforcement Cases

October 2009

OFT 1139
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

1.1 The OFT’s mission is to make markets work well for consumers. This means acting to remove consumer detriment in the widest sense of outcomes that are less than optimal for consumers. Amongst the methods the OFT uses to achieve this goal is enforcement. Consumer protection law is an important part of the OFT’s enforcement activities. In particular, where the OFT believes that consumers and other businesses are suffering harm, the OFT may use a combination of intervention tools to address the causes of the detriment.¹

1.2 The principal aims of this study were to review the effectiveness of a sample of six consumer enforcement interventions, to assess and discuss the implications of previous approaches and to consider how to monitor and enhance performance in future interventions. This study is not concerned with whether particular traders committed breaches as a matter of law, or to identify loss or damages that could be claimed by individual consumers in court (see the Note on Legal Issues that follows this executive summary). Rather, it is an economic study that seeks, on the basis of extrapolation from different data sources, to measure intervention outcomes for consumers and markets generally.

Evaluation aims

1.3 The six case studies were selected to address the following questions:

- What were the sources and level of consumer detriment associated with particular interventions?

• What were the consequences of the OFT’s intervention for targeted businesses, for consumers and for the market more generally?

• What wider impacts might result from the interventions in terms of increasing deterrence amongst non-targeted businesses and consumer confidence?

• How can the OFT monitor the success of similar interventions in future?

1.4 The cases selected for our analysis cover diverse types of consumer detriment with different intervention tools being used across cases. Where the term ‘detriment’ is used, it refers to detriment defined not in legal terms, but on the basis of the data available and stated assumptions, for the purposes of economic measurement. To clarify that detriment is meant in this sense, the term ‘Assumed Consumer Detriment’ or ACD is used in what follows.²

1.5 The six cases selected involved interventions relating to airline pricing, the trading activities of MB Designs, Book Club Associates advertising, Dabs (an online IT retailer) terms and conditions, Ryanair terms and conditions and clarification of Section 75 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974.

Key findings

1.6 All of the cases looked at have delivered positive benefits for consumers. The overall yearly benefit figure of £243 million compares very favourably with estimated costs to OFT of £2.4 million, and includes:

• an estimated saving of £131 million a year delivered by cross-industry action in respect of airline pricing through the inclusion of fixed non-optional costs in advertised prices. The size of the online flight ticket booking market is estimated at £7.4 billion

2 See the Note on Legal Issues below for more detail as to what is and is not meant by ‘detriment’ in this study.
• an estimated saving of £99 million a year delivered by the OFT clarifying the applicability of Section 75 to overseas credit card transactions

• a saving of £10.7 million due to an intervention against the unfavourable trading activities of MB Designs (a double glazing supplier)

• smaller, but still significant savings were made in other markets such as book clubs and electronic goods, as well as an intervention that resulted in Ryanair amending their terms and conditions.

1.7 A summary of the quantification of impacts can be found in Table A. Benefits to consumers are delivered in a variety of ways. Whilst a precondition for success is that businesses change their prior conduct, for the six cases examined, the greatest benefits are delivered where interventions result in consumers incurring lower costs and making better choices in transactions (accounting for 76 per cent of overall yearly benefits).

1.8 The next highest benefit comes from a reduction in deterred complaints (19 per cent of overall yearly benefits). The study of the six interventions highlighted a number of reasons why consumers may be deterred from seeking redress when problematic situations occur. When an intervention succeeds in improving consumer awareness of their rights and confidence in the process of seeking redress, the consumer benefit achieved is significant. However, to fully maximise this benefit requires the targeted company to have in place a satisfactory approach to complaint handling.

1.9 The six cases had a smaller impact (less than four per cent of yearly benefits) in terms of deterring similar actions by non-targeted business. Nevertheless the cases highlight OFT interventions can deliver benefits through having a deterrent effect on non-targeted businesses and preventing infringements of a similar nature from occurring. This is particularly likely for precedent setting cases that receive media attention and also cases with high visibility amongst competitors, as was the case
for the two interventions in our sample that had a deterrent effect (MB Designs and Ryanair).

1.10 In our sample, interventions targeting unfavourable terms and conditions had relatively less impact than those targeting advertising that was considered to be misleading or Sales of Goods Act (SoGA) cases. This is likely because in the cases in our sample unfavourable terms only manifested themselves when the consumer actually had a specific problem and, the incidence of these specific problems was relatively small, such as lost luggage in the case of Ryanair. Nevertheless, all passengers with luggage incur a risk that if theirs is lost, they may not receive adequate compensation, a factor which affects confidence in the market. There may also be some markets where unfavourable terms have the potential to result in significant detriment should sufficient consumers be expected to experience the relevant problem. On the other hand, misleading advertising and sale of goods of inadequate quality can be expected to affect a large proportion of a seller’s customer base.

Methodology

1.11 The case studies were developed in parallel and our approach to each case shared a number of common steps, from initially providing an overview of the market and developing an intervention logic model for each case to subsequently assessing the situation post OFT intervention.

1.12 A number of different data sources informed our analysis. We undertook primary data collection across cases, including survey research for three cases studies. This was accompanied by in depth interviews with consumers, businesses and other stakeholders. We also utilised aggregated complaints data and existing OFT research to inform our calculations. See the Note on Legal Issues that follows below for an explanation of the difference in our treatment of evidence from that which would be characteristic of a legal, as opposed to an economic analysis.
Lessons learnt

1.13 There are two main ways in which results from these case studies may inform future thinking:

- measuring the success of consumer interventions
- targeting enforcement work.

Measuring the success of consumer interventions

1.14 The success of a consumer intervention is primarily measured by the achieved reduction in ACD. A quantification of the initial level of ACD is important when considering interventions. This was not originally available for the cases we looked at in this report. A number of techniques to estimate ACD are available to the OFT.

1.15 Information that can be drawn from consumer complaints can have a significant role. The OFT recently carried out a study that comprehensively assesses complaining behaviour of consumers in different markets. This analysis can valuably be combined with aggregated complaint information to help inform estimates of consumer benefits arising from OFT action.

1.16 The data recorded by Consumer Direct could be utilised further and may benefit from asking complainants a systematic set of questions, such as what the value of the transaction was, what percentage of that transaction was affected by the problem and how much time/money the consumer has spent in seeking redress. We recognise that this suggestion might have cost implications for the Consumer Direct business model, which we have not been in a position to consider.

1.17 In markets where the population affected is large, a survey may be a cost-effective and timely method to estimate the incidence of problems

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in the population. The results of a pre-intervention survey could then be compared with those of a post-intervention survey to help estimate the changes achieved by the intervention.4

Targeting and tailoring enforcement work to achieve high impact outcomes

1.18 In most of the cases studied here, the OFT intervention required targeted businesses to cease certain practices. A pre-condition for success is thus that businesses change their behaviour and make the changes required by the OFT. Improved business conduct may, however, take many forms and literal changes alone may do little to enhance consumer welfare. Before taking on an intervention, the OFT may want to consider the mechanism through which the intervention is expected to operate. In particular, if post intervention, there is a wide range of actions that businesses can take to undo or undermine the effects of the change imposed by the OFT, then the intervention’s success may be a priori compromised.

1.19 Even if a good outcome in terms of improved business conduct is expected, an intervention uses up scarce resources and these should be allocated where ultimately benefits to consumers are greatest. As such, impact is one important consideration before taking on these actions.5

1.20 On the basis of the limited sample of cases we examined, interventions targeting problems that potentially occur more frequently or that potentially affect a very large share of all transactions are likely to have a larger impact on consumers.

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4 This is clearly a simplification. No assessment would ever be quite as straightforward and a number of controls and supporting analysis would have to be included. Changes in a market may be attributable to many factors and the fact that the OFT made an intervention may be only one of several explanatory factors for observed changes.

1.21 When designing an intervention or considering which markets are most worth tackling, the OFT should put some weight on the potential deterrent effect that an intervention can have.

1.22 There are two main ways in which an intervention can deter other similar problems: through adverse reputational effects and through anticipation of [high] financial penalties which remove/reduce the gains from infringements.⁶

1.23 Under the powers available to it at the time of these six interventions, the OFT did not have the option of imposing financial penalties on infringing businesses. However, fines, financial civil sanctions and compensation to injured parties may be able to play a significant role in future consumer enforcement, particularly under powers that it is proposed the OFT and a group of local authorities should pilot. This is not to say that such penalties would necessarily have had any role to play in any of the six cases covered by this study. Heavy financial sanctions are likely only ever to be available where there are serious and undoubted breaches of law. But in appropriate cases, the anticipation of high financial costs can be an effective deterrent to potential infringers.

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⁶ Criminalisation is a third one, forming part of OFT’s enforcement policy where activity borders on being criminal, for instance when dealing with rogue traders such as scammers.
### Table A: Quantification of impacts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Estimated size of affected market</th>
<th>Relevant legislation</th>
<th>Estimated OFT costs</th>
<th>Estimated yearly reduction in ACD</th>
<th>How the reduction in ACD is broken down</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airline pricing</td>
<td>£7.4 billion</td>
<td>CMARs</td>
<td>£310,000</td>
<td>£131 million</td>
<td>Consumers have lower costs / make better choices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 75</td>
<td>£11 billion</td>
<td>Consumer Credit Act</td>
<td>£1 million</td>
<td>£99 million</td>
<td>Improved consumer confidence: Fewer deterred complaints</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MB Designs</td>
<td>£3 million*</td>
<td>Sale of Goods Act</td>
<td>£520,000</td>
<td>£10.7 million</td>
<td>Deterrent effect on other businesses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Supply of Goods and Services Act</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Other benefits from better business conduct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UTCCRs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ryanair</td>
<td>£950 million</td>
<td>UTCCRs</td>
<td>£360,000</td>
<td>£1.4 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCA</td>
<td>£100 million</td>
<td>CMARs</td>
<td>£210,000</td>
<td>£876,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dabs</td>
<td>£200 million</td>
<td>UTCCRs</td>
<td>£13,000</td>
<td>£78,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (£000s)</strong></td>
<td><strong>£2.4 million</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>£243 million</strong></td>
<td><strong>£185,336</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7 The figures presented for MB Designs, Ryanair, BCA and Dabs are estimates of yearly company turnover as these interventions were focused on the consumers of the individual companies in question. In contrast, the figures for airline pricing and Section 75 cases relate to the wider market reflecting the fact these interventions reach beyond an individual company. See our introduction section for more details on these estimates. Ryanair’s latest year annual turnover was £2.5 billion but only a fraction of this will be UK passengers (we have assumed 38 per cent based on the 2008 annual report).

8 We estimate the value of the Scottish market for windows and doors at £462 million in 2007 (8.1 per cent of the UK market estimated on the basis that Scotland represents 8.1 per cent of UK GDP). We estimate a less than 1 per cent market share for MB Designs.
NOTE ON LEGAL ISSUES

This study is an independent quantitative assessment by London Economics of the economic effectiveness of six OFT enforcement interventions in markets. Although it has an economic purpose, a number of legal issues may be considered to arise in connection with the study itself and its subject matter.

Authorship

The authors of this report are London Economics (an independent economic consultancy). The work was commissioned by the OFT and this report of its findings is published by the OFT, and given the nature of the subject matter, the OFT is necessarily the source of most of the data on which it is based. However, the views expressed are, on all issues, those of London Economics not the OFT unless otherwise indicated.

The OFT’s role as an enforcer includes monitoring compliance with consumer legalisation generally, and particularly with any undertakings given to it. It might well be likely to consider, as evidence, some of the same data that has been used for the purposes of this study. It is therefore important to make clear that such data has been looked at separately from and independently of the OFT’s enforcement activity, for different purposes, and using wholly different methodology from that which would have been adopted by an enforcer.

Purpose

The OFT is a statutory body accountable to Parliament and HM Treasury for its use of public money. The OFT has a performance target agreed with HM Treasury of delivering direct financial benefits to consumers of at least five times its cost to the taxpayer. It has the function of informing the public about its work and is committed to demonstrating a high level of transparency in its work. It is also under a duty to review and report publicly on its exercise of its

9 Enterprise Act 2002 s.6

10 See www.oft.gov.uk/about/transparency
regulatory functions. This study by London Economics is published by the OFT with the aim of meeting these duties and commitments.

This study seeks to advance understanding of OFT’s use of its consumer enforcement powers. It presents and considers evidence arising from six case-studies relevant to the following issues:

- how far behaviour by businesses was, before the OFT intervened, causing sub-optimal economic outcomes for consumers, and how far it did so afterwards
- to what extent any change in outcomes for consumers can be attributed to OFT’s interventions.

As a matter of law, the OFT’s use of its consumer enforcement powers can be triggered only by reasonable suspicion that breaches of legal obligation have occurred. The mechanism of enforcement is purely legal. If the matter goes to court, there will be a determination as to whether any infringement has actually occurred, and if it has an order may be made prohibiting its continuance. Note that most of the cases covered by this study were settled out of court, without any finding or admission as to breaches on the part of the businesses involved, so any contentions as to breaches of law that are mentioned in this study remain a matter of OFT’s opinion, not settled law.

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11 Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 Part 4

12 This is a simplified description which does not precisely reflect the nature of all of the OFT’s consumer enforcement powers. In certain cases, an order can be sought to restrain anticipated breaches. The OFT also has certain non-injunctive powers, principally licensing functions under the Consumer Credit Act 1974, and the prosecution powers under the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008, which were not available at the time the interventions covered by this study were undertaken.

13 An interim court order was obtained by the OFT against MB Designs Ltd, but the case was ultimately settled without admission of liability on the part of the company. The case brought by the OFT in relation to s.75 of the Consumer Credit Act was finally determined in the OFT’s favour in court, but was a case designed to clarify the law rather than restrain breaches of it.
However, the OFT’s use of these legal tools is of necessity highly selective, and as a matter of policy cases are selected with the overall objective of making markets work well for consumers. For this reason, and in order to better meet its HM Treasury commitments, the OFT prioritises its work on the basis of likely measurable impact on consumers. Its aim in carrying out the interventions covered was, therefore, not just, and indeed not primarily, to stop breaches of law from occurring but to achieve improved outcomes for consumers.

Since there was both a legal and an economic dimension to the interventions covered by this study, it is important to clarify that this study is concerned with the economic dimension, and embodies an economic, not a legal analysis. It has three characteristics that an investigation of enforcement effectiveness from a purely legal point of view would not have:

- it looks at whether business behaviour meets the policy objectives of OFT intervention, not whether it complies with legal obligations
- it seeks to assess impact on the welfare of consumers generally, not outcomes for those consumers (if any) who encountered breaches of law
- it seeks to identify sub-optimal consumer outcomes in a broad sense – not only or mainly the kinds of detriment (if any) that would have been significant for legal purposes.

These characteristics have major implications for the approach to evidence taken in the study and the conclusions that can be drawn from it.

**Factors affecting use of evidence**

Consumer law may be said to be moving towards a less prescriptive and more principle-based approach, but it cannot prohibit all forms of sub-optimal economic behaviour. Any legal provision has to be narrowly defined to ensure certainty in its application, and is properly concerned not just with economics but also with ethical and social issues. Hence a study that inquired only into behaviour that demonstrably involved breaches of obligation in particular cases, even a large number of cases, would inevitably miss much of the economic impact of OFT’s activity. For these reasons, this study is not based on any investigation of whether breaches of law occurred.
Similarly, the study is properly concerned to identify the full range of economic outcomes for consumers. It is therefore not concerned with whether individuals experienced only loss or harm that might have been legally recoverable. For instance, it considers how far consumers may have suffered annoyance and frustration as a result of business behaviour, and how much of their leisure time was taken. These are not normally matters taken into account by the courts in assessing liability to pay compensation.

**Use of complaints and similar data**

For all these reasons, the methodology of this study is quite different from that which would have been appropriate in the context of a legal analysis. In common with economic research generally, it is based on extrapolation from sample evidence treated according to stated assumptions.

The raw material of these studies includes complaint, survey and interview data. Had the study aimed to assess OFT effectiveness in tackling breaches of law it would have involved detailed enquiry into individual cases with careful cross-checking of facts alleged in the data. This would have been needed because, as already noted, OFT’s interventions did not in general result in court findings - where they did not, the question of whether breaches actually took place is inherently contestable and potentially controversial. Apart from the cost and difficulty of such a detailed enquiry, it would have restricted and distorted the scope of the study. Accordingly, no investigation has been made of the actual facts related to any individual complaint.

Instead, the data has been processed on the assumption that the numbers and nature of complaints made by consumers are likely to be broadly consistent with their actual experience of sub-optimal outcomes. That is in line with the focus of the study on outcomes generally, not on breaches of law, and with the fact that consumers are better qualified to describe their experience than to judge whether the law has been broken. Similarly, what consumers say in interviews about their experience is assumed to be not, in general, imaginary or seriously exaggerated. Of course consumers sometimes complain when they have had no real problem, but equally (in fact, far more often) they fail to complain when they have experienced a real problem.
We believe these to be reasonable and indeed uncontroversial assumptions. But they are just assumptions, not findings. From a legal point of view, the evidence we present does not prove that any individual experienced any harm. Accordingly, we refer to conclusions regarding consumer detriment as ‘assumed consumer detriment’ or ‘ACD’.

The above are assumptions that underlie the approach taken in this study. The technical detail of its methodology, including statistical and economic assumptions, is explained below. There are of course variations of approach as between the different component case-studies, and the methodology of each is covered in the relevant annex.

Conclusions to be drawn on legal issues

This is an economic study, and no conclusions can be drawn on legal issues arising in connection with the six case studies considered. In particular, it cannot be treated as embodying any finding or view of London Economics or a fortiori of the OFT as to

- whether any person has broken the law or any legal obligation (including the obligation to comply with undertakings given to the OFT)
- whether any consumers have, or could have, a claim for compensation in law against any persons named.

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14 This is not to say that none of the evidence could in any circumstances be relied upon in enforcement proceedings. Reference may be made in such proceedings even to unverified complaints for certain purposes. We express no view on whether any of the evidence we rely on is capable of being so used – that is a matter purely for the OFT or other enforcement agencies.
2 INTRODUCTION

2.1 This report is organised as follows:

- In this chapter we provide a brief overview of the objectives of our evaluation. We then outline the six cases selected, as well as considering the evolving nature of OFT’s consumer protection enforcement powers.

- In the following chapters we look at the methodological approach adopted across cases and key findings on effectiveness for the six selected OFT interventions.

- We finally conclude by considering what factors appear most important in determining the relative effectiveness of different interventions. We also make some suggestions for evaluating similar interventions in the future.

Objectives of the study

2.2 The OFT’s mission is to make markets work well for consumers. This means acting to remove consumer detriment in the widest sense of outcomes that are less than optimal for consumers. Amongst the methods the OFT uses to achieve this goal is enforcement.\(^\text{15}\) Consumer protection law is an important part of the OFT’s enforcement activities. In particular, where the OFT believes that consumers and other

\(^{15}\) The OFT has a range of tools at its disposal to make markets work well for consumers. In many cases, it will be appropriate to use a combination of these tools to address problems. These include preventative tools (such as the Consumer Codes Approval Scheme), diagnostic tools (including research and market studies) as well enforcement tools. For more details on the full range of tools available to the OFT, see www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/about_oft/ap09/ap09.pdf
businesses are suffering harm, the OFT may use a combination of intervention tools to address the causes of the detriment.\(^{16}\)

2.3 The principal aim of this study was to review the effectiveness of a sample of six consumer protection interventions, to assess and discuss the implications of previous approaches and to consider how to monitor and enhance performance in future interventions. This study is not concerned with whether particular traders committed breaches as a matter of law, or to identify loss or damages that could be claimed by individual consumers in court. Rather, it is an economic study that seeks, on the basis of extrapolation from different data sources, to measure intervention outcomes for consumers and the economy generally.

2.4 The cases selected for our analysis cover diverse types of consumer detriment with different intervention tools being used across cases. Where the term ‘detriment’ is used, it refers to detriment defined on the basis of stated assumptions coupled with data collected during the course of our research, for the purposes of economic measurement. To clarify that detriment is identified on the basis of assumptions appropriate to economic analysis, not legal analysis and cross-checking of contestable allegations, the term ‘Assumed Consumer Detriment’ or ACD is used at various points below.

2.5 A number of broad questions are addressed in each case study, namely:

1. What led the OFT to intervene and what was the initial level of ACD

2. What were the consequences of the OFT intervention from the perspective of:

   a. Businesses:

\(^{16}\) The statement of consumer protection enforcement principles elaborates further on the OFT’s approach and prioritisation processes (see [www.oft.gov.uk/shared_of/about/offines/ft964.pdf](http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_of/about/offines/ft964.pdf))
i. The targeted business

ii. Deterrent effect on non-targeted businesses

iii. Were there any unintended effects (either positive or negative)?

iv. Any burdens imposed by the intervention on other businesses

b. Consumers:

i. How have consumers benefited from the involvement of the OFT?

ii. What specific benefits can be quantified in monetary terms?

iii. Did the OFT’s intervention reduce the ACD in each case?

iv. Did the actions of the OFT improve consumer awareness, confidence and behaviour?

3. What measures can be used to monitor success in future?

4. What was the impact of any publicity surrounding the intervention in terms of general deterrence and consumer confidence?

Overview of the six interventions

2.6 The six interventions selected for our analysis are summarised below.
### Figure 2.1: Six case studies – summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case study</th>
<th>OFT contentions</th>
<th>Relevant legislation</th>
<th>Sources of ACD</th>
<th>Intervention tools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Airline pricing | advertised prices and first prices shown on websites do not include all compulsory charges | Control of Misleading Advertising Regulations (CMARs) | - Sub-optimal purchases  
- Time cost  
- Associated frustration | Dialogue and settlement |
| MB Designs Double Glazing | inadequate quality of products and fitting of windows and similar | Sale of goods and services relation UTCCRs | - Goods not fit for purpose  
- Installation of goods not of satisfactory quality  
- Redress lacking | Court order and undertakings to the Court |
| BCA book club | advertising did not clearly set out membership obligations | CMARs | - Consumers unclear about membership obligations  
- Costs associated with making complaints returning unwanted books | Dialogue and accepted undertakings |
| Dabs e-retailer of computers and accessories | unfavourable terms regarding returns and refunds | UTCCRs Distance Selling regulations | - High costs of making returns  
- Deterred from seeking redress | Dialogue and accepted undertakings |
| Ryanair terms and conditions | unfavourable for passengers; not reflecting consumers’ full rights under the relevant legislation | Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations (UTCCRs) | - Insufficient compensation (for cancellations, delays, denied boarding, and problems with lost or delayed baggage)  
- Costs of seeking redress  
- Deterred from seeking redress | Dialogue and settlement |
| Section 75 | lack of recognition of right of UK credit card holders to get compensation from the issuer in relation to purchases abroad | Consumer Credit Act | - Reduced use of credit cards abroad  
- Loss of protection for purchases made abroad  
- Deterred from seeking redress | OFT launched test case and obtained favourable Court clarification |
Airline pricing

2.7 The OFT had concerns about the practice by some airlines of quoting various unavoidable costs, such as taxes and surcharges, separately from the base fare on their websites and in advertisements. These costs were added to the price at a late stage in the booking process and, as a result, the actual price paid by consumers could be significantly higher than the headline price. The OFT challenged this practice under the Consumer Protection Act and the Control of Misleading Advertisements Regulations.

2.8 Thirteen airlines’ websites were targeted by the intervention: Aer Lingus, BMI baby, EasyJet, Flybe, Flythomascook, Germanwings, Globespan, Jet2, Monarch, Ryanair, Sky Europe, Thomsonfly and Wizz Air. Beginning in February 2007, the OFT initiated actions which aimed to ensure that all compulsory costs were included in the headline prices of flights displayed on websites and in other media. While the majority of the thirteen airlines were quick to make the changes required, the last company made progress by February 2008.

2.9 We identified, for the purposes of this study, three sources of ACD prior to OFT’s intervention:

- consumers fail to identify the best value when they purchase flights online
- consumers spend a longer time searching each site or abandon searches when unavoidable costs are added at the end and
- consumers suffer associated frustration.

2.10 The size of the online flight ticket booking market is estimated at £7.4 billion.

MB Designs

2.11 The case against the double glazing company, MB Designs Scotland (Limited) (MB Designs), involved what the OFT contended were breaches of obligations under the Sale of Goods Act 1979; the Supply of Goods
and Services Act 1982 and the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulation 1999. Such breaches may be enforced under the Enterprise Act 2002 provided that they harm the collective interests of consumers.

2.12 The OFT had the following main concerns:

- Goods supplied by MB Designs appeared to be, in cases brought to the OFT’s attention, of an unsatisfactory quality not fit for purpose and/or did not correspond to the descriptions provided by MB Designs to the consumer.

- In cases drawn to the OFT’s attention, MB Designs appeared to have carried out installation work without exercising the level of skill and care that could be expected of a reasonably competent installer of products supplied.

- MB Designs appeared to be relying on a contract term which was potentially unfair in that it allowed them to exclude liability for all statements which did not appear in the written contract made with consumers, and thus put the firm in a position to refuse to be bound by oral statements and promises made to consumers by its representatives.

2.13 Furthermore, from evidence before the OFT, it did not appear that consumers’ complaints were being resolved satisfactorily by the company.

2.14 Negotiations between the OFT and MB Designs did not produce a resolution but the OFT obtained an interim enforcement order in June 2005 against MB Designs and its Directors. This order was the first of its kind in Scotland granted under the Enterprise Act 2002. In broad terms, it stated that MB Designs and its Directors should stop certain specified infringements of law that were held to be harmful to the collective interests of consumers, namely:

- using or relying on terms disclaiming responsibility for commitments not included in the written contract
• supplying products that were of unsatisfactory quality or unfit for purpose or which failed to correspond to their descriptions

• failing to exercise the skill and care to be expected of a reasonably competent installer of windows, doors and conservatories.

2.15 The case was settled with MB Designs and its Directors giving a formal undertaking to the Court of Session. The settlement made the main points of the interim enforcement order permanent.

2.16 The estimated turnover of MB Designs at the time of the intervention was £3 million per annum.17

Book Club Associates

2.17 Book Club Associates (BCA) is one of the few remaining book clubs in the UK that adheres to the traditional book club model. Typically this model attracts members with a heavily discounted introductory offer in return for a requirement to purchase a minimum number of books over a certain period of time and to buy monthly recommended books (the ‘Editor’s Choice’), unless specifically rejected each time.

2.18 The OFT considered that a number of the claims made in BCA’s advertising were misleading under the Control of Misleading Advertising Regulations. Whilst BCA did not accept that their advertisements were misleading (and this was not determined as a matter of law in the courts) they gave undertakings to the OFT in July 2007 to provide clearer information in adverts about the obligations of consumers when joining BCA’s book clubs.

2.19 We identified, for the purposes of this study, the following main sources of ACD prior to the OFT’s intervention:

• consumers being unclear about the terms of their contract with BCA

17 We estimate the value of the Scottish market for windows and doors at £462 million in 2007 (8.1 per cent of the UK market estimated on the basis that Scotland represents 8.1 per cent of UK GDP). We estimate a less than 1 per cent market share for MB Designs.
• consumers paying for unwanted goods
• consumers spending time and money making complaints and seeking redress.

2.20 It is estimated that BCA clubs have more than one million members and an annual turnover in the order of £100 million.

Dabs

2.21 Dabs.com (Dabs) is an online IT retailer. The company has positioned itself as a low priced online retailer with a large product offering competing on price and product range with the high street retailers.

2.22 The OFT identified terms and conditions in Dabs’ consumer contract that raised concerns under the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations and the Distance Selling Regulations. Following discussions with the OFT, Dabs agreed to delete or revise certain terms.

2.23 We identified, for the purposes of this study, the following sources of ACD prior to the OFT’s intervention:

• some consumers were deterred from making a complaint and pursuing redress from the retailer
• of those who had sought redress from the retailer, some would find the process to be unduly costly and/or the outcome to be inadequate.

2.24 We estimate the yearly turnover of Dabs at £200 million.

Ryanair terms and conditions

2.25 The OFT had three main concerns in relation to Ryanair’s contract terms:

2.26 The first issue concerned passengers’ rights when flights are cancelled or delayed, or if they are denied boarding to a flight. The OFT considered
that Ryanair’s terms did not reflect consumers’ full rights under EU Regulation 261/2004.\textsuperscript{18}

2.27 The second concerned Ryanair’s liability for baggage claims. Ryanair’s terms and conditions put conditions on how travellers should claim for compensation. The OFT considered that Ryanair’s conditions on its limit of liability relieved the airline of liability to a greater extent than permitted by the Montreal Convention.\textsuperscript{19}

2.28 Thirdly, Ryanair’s terms excluded liability for damage or delay to non-standard baggage items. These items were carried on a 'limited release basis', which meant they were carried at the passenger’s own risk.

2.29 After entering into dialogue with the OFT in 2004 regarding these three terms, Ryanair amended all three terms by the end of October 2006. As a result the exclusions of liability and baggage claim requirements were removed, and consumers’ rights under the EU Regulation were amended.

2.30 We identified, for the purposes of this study, the following sources of ACD prior to OFT’s intervention:

- consumers received inadequate compensation (for cancellations, delays, denied boarding, and problems with lost or delayed baggage)
- consumers faced excessive costs when seeking redress (time spent, repeated contact required, restrictive procedures)
- consumers were deterred from complaining and seeking redress.

2.31 The UK turnover of Ryanair is estimated at £950 million per annum.

\textsuperscript{18} This regulation establishes common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding, cancellation and long delay of flights.

\textsuperscript{19} The Montreal Convention on the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air was signed in 1999 by most European countries, the European Union and the United States of America. It covers, among other legal aspects, the air carrier liability for passenger’s injuries and death and for baggage and cargo damages and delay.
Consumer Credit Act 1974 Section 75

2.32 Section 75 protects consumers who use a credit card to buy goods or services valued over £100 and up to £30,000. Creditors involved in a debtor-creditor-supplier agreement (credit advanced to buy goods and services from a linked supplier) are jointly and severally\(^{20}\) liable with the supplier in the event of a breach of contract or misrepresentation.\(^{21}\) There is no requirement for the consumer to proceed first against the supplier.

2.33 The credit card companies however contended that Section 75 was not applicable to overseas transactions. The OFT sought a declaration to clarify the existing law. A series of judgments and appeals over a period of four years culminated with a 2007 final judgement in the House of Lords which found fully in favour of the OFT.

2.34 Despite their objections, most of the issuers had already operated a voluntary policy of meeting claims that would be valid under Section 75, although only up to the value of the credit extended\(^{22}\) on the transaction. The judgement therefore appeared to result in little immediate change in the behaviour of the major card issuers.

2.35 The main benefits of the intervention arose from clarification of a point of law and as a result consumers being better informed\(^{23}\) and making

\(^{20}\) Joint and several liability is a form of liability that is used in civil cases where two or more parties are found liable for damages. The winning plaintiff in such a case may collect the entire judgment from any one of the parties, or from any and all of the parties in various amounts until the judgment is paid in full. In other words, if any of the defendants do not have enough money or assets to pay an equal share of the award, the other defendants must make up the difference.

\(^{21}\) For example, in relation to a faulty item purchased abroad using a credit card, the liability of the credit card company is similar to the liability of the foreign seller.

\(^{22}\) In other words, an item may have been paid for only in part with a credit card. The credit card company would argue it had liability only up to the level of credit that was extended but the legal position is in fact that the liability is for the entire value and any consequential loss.

\(^{23}\) According to the results of our consumer survey.
more use of their rights under S75. This occurred in three broad fashions:

- if a problem arose with a purchase, credit card users were able to deal with the credit card company rather than with a distant overseas supplier(s)
- as a result consumers were more likely to use credit cards than another form of payment and
- consumers were more confident about purchasing from abroad at cheaper prices.

2.36 We estimate that the ruling affected overseas transactions totalling about £11 billion per year.

The cases in context: OFT’s evolving powers

2.37 Since the six interventions detailed above were undertaken the powers available to the OFT have changed, as has the OFT’s approach to consumer protection.24 The interventions featured within this report, therefore, should be viewed in the context of a number of changes in the regulatory landscape and other potential changes on the horizon that will confer stronger powers on the OFT. The impact of changes or proposed changes to the landscape were outside the scope of this study.

2.38 The OFT has a number of enforcement duties and a range of enforcement powers derived from consumer protection legislation.25 In addition, Part 8 of the Enterprise Act 2002 gives the OFT the power to enforce a wide range of existing consumer protection legislation,


including provisions derived from European Directives and purely domestic legislation.

2.39 The OFT now has wider powers in the area of enforcement of consumer protection legislation. The Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations (CPRs) came into force on 26 May 2008 and implement the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (UCPD) which is designed to harmonise the legislation across the European Union preventing business practices that are unfair to consumers.

2.40 In addition, in 2008, Part 3 of the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions (RES) Act introduced a framework for new powers for regulators, to introduce more choice in how they enforce, ensuring that the action taken is proportionate to the offence and the harm caused to consumers. Under these new powers, a range of new civil sanctions including fixed monetary penalties, restoration orders, stop notices and enforcement undertakings can be set up by departments. The powers would only be available for criminal offences, which could cover certain breaches of the

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26 The CPRs consist of:

- A general duty not to trade unfairly by acting contrary to the requirements of professional diligence so as to distort the average consumer’s decisions in relation to the product or service. This can be broadly understood as failing to act in accordance with acceptable trading practice a reasonable person would expect.

- Prohibitions of misleading and aggressive practices. Examples include withholding material information from consumers so as to impair their ability to make an informed choice, or coercing a consumer into making a decision.

- 31 specific listed practices that are considered to be unfair in all circumstances and are therefore, banned. Examples include falsely stating that a product will only be available for a very limited time and therefore depriving consumers of sufficient opportunity or time to make an informed choice. Other banned practices include, various prohibitions dealing with abuse of approval schemes, refusing to leave a consumer’s home when asked to do so, and operating or promoting a pyramid scheme.

The Regulations are enforceable through the civil and criminal courts.
Consumer Credit Act, the Estate Agency Act, the Cartel offence in the Enterprise Act, the Business Protection from Misleading Marketing Regulations, and the CPRs.

2.41 In its White Paper – ‘A Better Deal for Consumers Delivering Real Help Now and Change for the Future’ – the Government proposes to launch a series of pilot projects to test the use of new powers to deliver compensation for consumers. Pilots are expected to start in Autumn 2010 and will allow the use of RES Act powers instead of criminal prosecution. These pilots will involve both the OFT and Trading Standards Services.

2.42 The discussion that we present in the remainder of this report is mostly based on the analysis of the six interventions, all of which took place before these new powers came into force. It is recognised that the OFT has now considerably more scope to act in similar cases.
3 METHODOLOGY

3.1 The case studies were developed in parallel and our approach to each case shared a number of common steps. A schematic overview of our methodological approach to each case study is illustrated in Figure 3.1.

**Figure 3.1: Schematic overview of methodological approach**

- Analysis of OFT case documents
  - Overview of the market / market structure
  - Nature and composition of assumed consumer detriment
  - Initial level of assumed detriment and of its components
  - Changes in business behaviours by targeted sellers
  - Other reactions to intervention - by targeted sellers - by other sellers
  - Impact of changes in business behaviours and other reactions on reduction/elimination of assumed consumer detriment
  - Evaluation of final outcomes for targeted consumer groups
  - Evaluation of final outcomes more broadly

3.2 The figure above indicates how we approached each of the components of the case studies, with a particular focus on the information sources used.

3.3 We used independent analysis and different data sources in combination with information provided by the OFT in order to gain an understanding of the background to each intervention and of the initial sources of ACD.

3.4 This was followed by an assessment of the immediate economic impacts of the intervention firstly in terms of reactions by targeted businesses
and secondly in terms of the resulting effect on consumers. The sources of information used varied from case to case. In three cases we used consumer surveys that were sub-contracted to a specialist market research company (Ipsos MORI). In five of the cases we used aggregated complaints data, some from Consumer Direct or Trading Standards Offices and some from industry-specific consumer protection organisations. In four of the cases we used in-depth consumer interviews to gain a better understanding, from the consumers’ perspective, of the changes that occurred as a consequence of OFT’s interventions (working jointly with Ipsos MORI again). In all six cases we interviewed a combination of other industry-specialist representatives and businesses. This is summarised in Figure 3.2 below.

**Figure 3.2: Typology of cases: Information sources**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case study</th>
<th>consumer surveys</th>
<th>complaints data</th>
<th>consumer interviews</th>
<th>stakeholder interviews</th>
<th>OFT case officers, case documents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airline pricing</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, from other sources</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MB Designs</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes, from Trading Standards and Consumer Direct</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCA</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes, from Consumer Direct</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dabs</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes, from Consumer Direct</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ryanair terms and conditions</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, from other sources</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 75</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Methods to collect information

3.5 We discuss here the methods that we used for primary data collection.

Consumer surveys

3.6 Consumer surveys can be a useful tool to estimate the incidence of particular problems in the population. However, this tool will only be cost effective when the subject population is relatively easy to target. This will generally be the case for businesses and markets where the respective consumer base is large.

3.7 Three of the six case studies related to a relatively large and widespread consumer base: airline pricing, Ryanair terms and conditions and Section 75. In the other cases, interventions targeted a relatively small group of consumers and as such a consumer survey was not practicable.

3.8 Ideally, from an economic point of view, a consumer survey would be performed prior to the intervention and also post-intervention. In this way, it would be possible to directly compare the incidence of problems pre and post intervention. Such a survey could ask about costs facing the consumers prior to the intervention, about their type and their magnitude. It could also be useful to ask consumers how they might react to different types of intervention (while noting that hypothetical questions have to be carefully framed to maximise reliability of answers).

3.9 For the three cases where we used consumer surveys, a prior survey had not been undertaken. Survey respondents may have trouble recollecting events and perceptions of situations that existed in the past, particularly if more than two years ago. The surveys were therefore

27 In the airline pricing case, it would have been useful to understand consumers’ internet flight search habits prior to the intervention; the extent to which there was a perception of spending a lot of time until seeing the final price and the assessment of price dispersion encountered.

In the Section 75 case, it would have been ideal to know how many credit card holders were aware of the protection afforded by card purchases prior to the intervention and whether this knowledge influenced their decisions to use cards abroad.
designed to enquire about perceptions of certain things having changed and how consumers see themselves reacting to such perceived changes.

Statistical properties of survey results

3.10 The number of achieved respondents in the airline pricing and in the Section 75 surveys was over 1,000 in each case. For the Ryanair case study, we had 344 respondents.

3.11 We have used answers to particular questions to help estimate individual components of ACD and respective changes after the intervention. When we use a percentage of survey respondents to make inferences for what the prevalence of that answer would be in the entire relevant population, we expect a certain margin of error in doing so. This margin of error can be precisely calculated. In particular, we can determine the size of the confidence interval around a particular point estimate where with a certain degree of confidence (95 per cent) the corresponding percentage of the entire population would lie. The larger the sample size, the smaller the size of the confidence interval.\(^{28}\)

3.12 In each of the case studies and for each of the calculations where survey results are used, findings are cross referenced to particular survey questions. Findings for each survey question are subject to confidence intervals, and not all differences are statistically significant. The report only comments on findings that are statistically significant unless otherwise stated.

Complaint data

3.13 Aggregated complaint data collected by the OFT’s Consumer Direct, by Trading Standards Offices and by other consumer representative

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\(^{28}\) Some of the percentages of respondents’ answers that we use are not however responses to questions that were posed to all survey respondents. In some cases, a question is not relevant to all and is responded to only by a sub-set of the original sample. For these answers, the size of the confidence interval will be larger. The size of the confidence interval also depends on the percentage of survey respondents that answered in a certain way. The worst case is where 50 per cent of the population chooses a particular answer. In other words, if 10 per cent choose answer A the confidence interval is smaller then when 50 per cent choose answer A.
organisations have proved useful sources of information in order to assess the impact of some of the interventions studied here. These data are particularly valuable when wider consumer surveys are not feasible and there is otherwise little information about the type of problems that consumers encounter. Complaint data have not for the most part been subject to detailed verification. It is in our view reasonable for the purpose of economic analysis to draw conclusions as to ACD levels from sufficient quantities of raw complaint data of this kind, subject to setting out the assumptions involved with appropriate caveats. See the Note on Legal Issues on how this approach differs from that which would be have been taken for the purposes of a legal analysis.

3.14 Aggregated complaint data can, for the purposes of an economic study of this kind, be used to estimate the average cost to consumers of the problems that they encounter. We have done this in two of the case studies for which there was no other source of information.

3.15 Together with research on the incidence of problems, complaint data can be used to derive initial estimates of ACD for various markets. In general, we expect there to be a certain proportion of consumers that face problems with the products or the seller and yet typically will not complain. We can use this proportion to estimate, out of a given number of complaints received, the likely number of total problems faced by the entire relevant consumer segment.

3.16 Clearly, there are many variables that affect the percentage of people with problems that will make a complaint or take any further action. These include the size of the loss, the frequency of the purchase, the information that consumers have about the product, the time lag until the particular inadequacy is discovered, among many others.

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29 The OFT has, in a recent study, made a comprehensive assessment of the expected ‘complaint behaviour’ of consumers in a number of situations: OFT, ‘Consumer detriment: Assessing the frequency and impact of consumer problems with goods and services’, April 2008, OFT992, downloadable at www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/consumer_protection/of992.pdf
3.17 The recently published ‘OFT Positive Impact report’\textsuperscript{30} uses sector specific multipliers\textsuperscript{31} to estimate the number of consumers with problems given information on the total number of complaints received by Consumer Direct.

3.18 The multiplier reflects the fact that, in general, only a small proportion of consumers who experience a problem make a complaint to Consumer Direct. The OFT’s Consumer Detriment Research indicates that the likelihood that a consumer will complain about a particular problem is sector specific. That is, the ratio of problems to complaints varies according to the sector that the trader operates in. For example, a consumer who experiences a problem with a trader in the house fittings and appliances sector is more likely to make a complaint to Consumer Direct than a consumer who experiences a problem with a trader in the professional and financial services sector. The OFT thus uses different multiplier values for each intervention and these depend on the sector where the targeted trader operates. A list of sectors and their associated multipliers is given below.

\textsuperscript{30} The OFT’s recently published ‘Positive Impact 08/09’ report quantifies consumer benefits of Consumer Protection Group enforcement action for 2008/09 based on Consumer Direct complaint data.

\textsuperscript{31} The sector specific multiplier are based on estimates of the total number of problems per sector identified in the Consumer Detriment research compared to the number of complaints received by CD per sector.
### Figure 3.3: Complaint numbers multipliers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Multiplier ($M$)</th>
<th>Case study it is applicable to</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(A) House Fittings and appliances</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>MB designs, Dabs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B) Other household requirements</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) Personal goods and services</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(D) Professional and financial services</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(E) Transport</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(F) Leisure</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>BCA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


3.19 These numbers are based on a direct analysis of the responses to the OFT study on consumer detriment. The figure below, from that report, clearly illustrates the large variations in complaint behaviour across sectors.
3.20 While, on average, 64 per cent of people with problems complain or take further action, this percentage actually ranges between 43 per cent and 77 per cent across the different types of purchase.

3.21 But in addition to whether people complain or not, we need to also take into account who they complain to. The OFT study found that a large fraction complain direct to the seller and another large fraction complain to organisations other than Consumer Direct. This is depicted below.

3.22 In the group of respondents that made a complaint to someone other than the seller, there is still a diversity of organisations receiving these complaints. Only about 27 per cent of the 12 per cent who make a complaint to someone else complain to either TSS or OFT/CD.
3.23 Using OFT’s 2008 consumer detriment survey results, we can thus find an average estimate of the original number of people with problems (X) when we observe a certain number (C) of Consumer Direct + OFT + Trading Standards complaints.

\[
X \times (0.64) \times (0.12) \times (0.27) = C \quad \text{thus} \quad X = 48.2 \times C
\]

For example, if number of complaints (C) is 300, we estimate number of consumers that had problems by

\[
X = 48.2 \times 300 = 14,468
\]

3.24 Clearly, this general approach can be fine-tuned to better reflect particular circumstances of the cases as well as making use of other information.

**Adjustment for growing complaint numbers**

3.25 We note the following correction to complaints data suggested in a recent OFT study.\(^3^2\)

3.26 ‘Before making a comparison of complaints before and after the intervention, we made an adjustment to compensate for the general increase in the number of complaints that were reported to Consumer Direct over the time period concerned. Over the time period of our searches (that is, 1 January 2006 to 31 March 2009), the overall volume of complaints reported to Consumer Direct increased by an average of 11 per cent a year. Therefore, an adjustment factor (A) with a value of 1.11 was multiplied by the number of complaints made against the trader during the 12 months before the trader intervention (Cb) to produce a ’counterfactual’. This is an estimate for the number of complaints that could reasonably be expected to have been made about

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the trader, during the following 12 months, had the TSS not made the intervention.’

3.27 We follow this approach and make the same correction in the two cases where we rely on the change in complaint numbers before and after the intervention (BCA and Dabs).

**Estimation of the value of time**

3.28 In estimating consumer benefits arising from the OFT interventions we often needed to put a value on the reduction of time spent by consumers resolving perceived problems.

3.29 If the time so spent is time that would have been spent at work, we approximate the hourly value of that time by the average hourly wage rate for the UK. For time spent complaining outside work, we need to estimate the value of leisure time. To guide us, we resorted to the economics literature in two particular areas: the value of travelling time and the value of leisure time.

3.30 Because no explicit market exists for time spent at leisure, no market price for that time can be observed and the value of time, therefore, must be inferred. In principle, willingness to pay for savings of leisure time should be lower than willingness to pay for savings of work time, because the wage rate includes payment both for the effort and the scarce skills embodied in the work activity.

3.31 The literature has estimated the value of leisure time by asking survey respondents how much they would be willing to pay to save a certain amount of time on a trip to a leisure destination. Clearly, the willingness to pay for leisure time may vary by journey and timing, both because time may be valued differently at different times of the day, and because the travel activity may have some positive utility. Research, however, has shown that there are no significant differences in the value of non-working time saved associated with differences in journey purpose. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, a good rule of thumb
recommended in a World Bank publication is to value all leisure time saved equally at about one third of the traveller’s hourly wage.

3.32 Apart from this publication, many other authors have suggested using a similar fraction of hourly wage to value time. Amoako-Tuffour and Martinez-Espineira (2008) recognise that a common convention is to use one-third of the wage as the value of time (as do Hellerstein, 1993, Englin and Cameron, 1996; Bin et al., 2005). Cesario (1976) used 0.43 as the fraction of the wage rate corresponding to the cost of time, Liston-Heyes and Heyes (1999) and Hagerty and Moeltner (2005) used one-third of the wage. Sohngen et al. (2000) and Sarker and Surry (1998) used 0.3.

3.33 In conclusion, we have therefore chosen to use one-third of the average hourly wage in the UK to value time wasted dealing with problems facing consumers in each of the case studies. There are two exceptions. Firstly, for the airlines case study, where we had a clear separation

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34 Amoako-Tuffour, Joe and Martinez-Espineira, Roberto, 2008, ‘Leisure and the Opportunity Cost of Travel Time in Recreation Demand Analysis: A Re-Examination’, Munich Personal RePEc Archive


between business and leisure travellers, we have inputted the full hourly wage rate to time wasted by business travellers. Secondly, for the MB Designs case study, consumer interviews indicated that mostly time spent on repair and/or refitting appointments would typically involve time off from work. Therefore we have inputted the full hourly wage to time so spent by MB Designs consumers.
4 ASSESSMENT OF EFFECTIVENESS

4.1 Our assessment of the efficacy of the interventions can be viewed in terms of several objectives, as summarised in Figure 4.1.

4.2 In Figure 4.1 we look at outcomes of the interventions in a number of dimensions. The first element is business behaviour. By this we mean, in a strict sense, the extent to which the targeted businesses changed their behaviour following the OFT intervention. This is our view of business conduct as it affects economic outcomes for consumers, not the legal assessment of compliance with obligations that might be conducted by the OFT in its capacity as a law enforcement agency.³⁶

4.3 Next, we consider the impact of the intervention on ACD. We do this in two columns. We firstly look at absolute reduction in ACD. Reductions that are below £1 million are considered small in absolute terms. We then assess the interventions in relative terms when compared to the total ACD that existed pre-intervention.

4.4 The figure also summarises the assessed impact of the intervention in terms of raising consumer confidence and thus achieving a reduction in the number of consumers that are deterred from complaining. As discussed, it is a common feature of almost all markets that a proportion of consumers with problems will not take any action. We found that in some of the cases one of the mechanisms through which the intervention translated into a benefit to consumers was through making them more confident and determined to seek redress.

4.5 The issue of countervailing actions taken by targeted firms in response to the OFT intervention is an important one. An intervention may succeed at making firms make certain changes, but there will generally be considerable scope for companies to take other actions that potentially undermine the objectives of the intervention.

³⁶ See Note on Legal Issues for clarification that what was assessed was effectiveness from an economic point of view, that is in bringing about improved economic outcomes for consumers, not legal effectiveness – in terms of bringing breaches of law to an end.
4.6 An intervention against one business, where there are clear infringements of the law, may be beneficial if it contributes to general deterrence of similar infringements by businesses operating in the same or similar markets. OFT actions can exert a deterrent effect if companies that become aware of those actions are keen to avoid similar actions being taken against them.

4.7 Finally, we consider the impact of the intervention on competition in the market. Previous actions or behaviours may have caused competition distortions that are reduced if the OFT intervention succeeds at stopping them.
Figure 4.1: Typology of cases: effectiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case study (relevant legislation)</th>
<th>Changes in business conduct (LE assessment)</th>
<th>Absolute reduction in ACD</th>
<th>Relative reduction in ACD</th>
<th>Improved consumer confidence: Reduction of deterred complaints</th>
<th>Countervailing actions by firms</th>
<th>Deterrence for other businesses</th>
<th>Positive impact on competition in the market</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airline pricing (Control of Misleading Advertisements)</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>very large</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>possibly significant</td>
<td>important</td>
<td>moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MB Designs (Sale of Goods Act; Supply of Goods and Services Act; UTCCRs)</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>large</td>
<td>very large</td>
<td>not effective</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>important</td>
<td>moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCA (Control of Misleading Advertisements)</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>small</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>unlikely to have been effective</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>minimal</td>
<td>minimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dabs (UTCCRs; Consumer Protection DSRs)</td>
<td>medium high</td>
<td>small</td>
<td>large</td>
<td>effective</td>
<td>unlikely to have been significant</td>
<td>minimal</td>
<td>minimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ryanair terms and conditions (UTCCRs)</td>
<td>adequate</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>effective</td>
<td>possibly significant</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 75 (Consumer Credit Act applicability)</td>
<td>no behavioural change</td>
<td>very large</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>effective</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

37 Reducions that are below £1 million are considered small in absolute terms.

38 This is the reduction in ACD compared to the total ACD that existed pre-intervention. Please see the associated annexes for more detail.
Reactions by targeted businesses

4.8 As Figure 4.1 highlights, changes made by the targeted businesses after all six interventions was, in our view, adequate to high. However, the column ‘countervailing actions by companies’, highlights the need to be mindful of the ability of certain targeted companies to undo some of an intervention’s objectives. In addition, as is apparent in our quantification of outcomes below, a change in behaviour, on its own, may not necessarily translate into a significant benefit to consumers.

4.9 In the case of Section 75, information from our stakeholder interviews indicated that there may have been little change in behaviour on the part of credit card companies. Although the objective of the OFT’s intervention to clarify a point of law was fully achieved, the transmission of this outcome into benefits for consumers is not straightforward and we found evidence of mixed messages being given by issuers’ customer service departments. In similar future cases, the OFT may wish to consider additional steps to ensure maximum improvement for consumers. This could include widespread publicity to build consumer awareness about the intervention.

4.10 The intervention on airline pricing was on our analysis successful at ensuring all targeted airlines included compulsory charges within their headline website prices. However, the ultimate objective, which was to make the search process faster and easier for consumers, was not entirely achieved as airline business models continued to evolve over time, creating new challenges for consumers. Some airline websites have now broken down the booking process into several steps where the consumer needs to opt in or out of a number of options that imply separate charges. As a result, in some cases, it still takes many ‘screens’ until the search gives the consumer the final price for the trip. This is likely to discourage consumers from searching more sites, contrary to the intention of the intervention.
Impact on ACD

4.11 We considered the impact of the six interventions not only in terms of absolute reduction in ACD but also in relative terms when compared to total ACD pre-intervention.

4.12 The absolute value of the estimated reduction in ACD is large in the airline pricing and Section 75 cases. This is partly attributable to the very large consumer base affected or potentially affected by these interventions. However, in relative terms to the total pre-intervention ACD arising from the same sources, the effectiveness of the interventions may have been only moderate.

4.13 In the case of airline pricing, consumers still face a protracted search process from initial input of desired flight details until information on the final cost of the trip is displayed.

4.14 In the Section 75 intervention, an important source of ACD was a lack of awareness on the part of consumers of their right to seek redress from credit card companies when problems occurred with credit card purchases made abroad. While the survey results indicate an improvement in awareness, the overall level is still low and greater consumer benefits could be achieved if consumers were better informed about their rights.

4.15 In contrast, the MB Designs case affected a much smaller consumer base but, in our view, the level of ACD experienced by individual customers before the OFT obtained its interim order was relatively much higher. In addition, the interim Court Order, a first ever such order in an application of the Enterprise Act in Scotland, set an important precedent, receiving much publicity. It was also perceived to have had a significant deterrent effect on other businesses in Scotland.

4.16 We estimate that the interventions on Dabs and BCA delivered relatively small consumer benefits. In the Dabs case, the initial level of ACD was low. Whilst the unfavourable terms made getting goods returned or repaired more costly or more complicated than otherwise, repairs were eventually made or refunds were given.
4.17 In the BCA case, we did not observe as large a reduction in relevant complaints as might have been expected.\footnote{We observed a reduction in relevant complaints of 81.3 per cent, whereas we may have expected a reduction post intervention even closer to 100 per cent.} One explanation may be inherent limitations to the scope of what can be achieved through intervention based on the use of purely prohibitive injunctive powers. The OFT was restricted to an approach aimed at removing what it considered to be objectionable, rather than inserting what it would have positively approved. In cases such as this, the form in which the information is presented to consumers can be important and the avoidance of approaches which are misleading may not necessarily amount to full transparency. The intervention might have benefitted from ex-ante testing of different forms of presenting information to assess which would be most effective, had the OFT had the power to prescribe forms in which information can be given in advertising. Unfortunately, as the law stands, it does not, so this approach was not open to the OFT.

4.18 The Ryanair intervention appears to have had moderate effectiveness in terms of reducing ACD. This case affects only the relatively small proportion of passengers who may experience a problem.\footnote{About 0.14 per cent according to our estimates.} It highlights that achieving a change in the wording of terms and conditions may only be a partial step towards eliminating ACD. It shows the importance of ongoing monitoring of how terms are applied in practice.\footnote{The OFT has continued to work with Ryanair on its terms and conditions.}

Improved consumer confidence

4.19 One important source of ACD results from situations where consumers are discouraged or prevented from making complaints. Complaints may be deterred if companies make their complaints procedure unduly costly and/or gain a reputation for offering little or no compensation to consumers. In the extreme, this can lead consumers to avoid participating in particular markets altogether. Interventions that improve
both consumer perceptions and the way in which sellers handle their customers, improve consumer confidence, increase consumer participation in markets and encourage consumers to complain and seek compensation when they encounter problems.

4.20 The actions of the OFT as well as those of other consumer representative bodies enhance consumer awareness of their rights and make them more confident in seeking redress when they have a negative experience. This in turn results in fewer deterred complaints.

4.21 Fewer deterred complaints were estimated for cases where we had indications that greater awareness of consumer rights was one of the outcomes of the intervention.

4.22 Three of the six cases studied involved the use of standard terms and conditions that were considered unfavourable from the point of view of consumers (Ryanair, MB Designs and Dabs). In two of these (MB Designs and Dabs), the intervention was quite effective in raising confidence and reducing deterred complaints. These cases were primarily concerned with terms under which the sellers offered compensation to buyers when problems occurred.

4.23 In the cases originated by action under legislation relating to misleading advertising or sale/supply of goods of inadequate quality, the effectiveness of reducing deterred complaints was, on our analysis, lower:

- Generally, in a Sale of Goods Act intervention, the objective is to get sellers to improve the products they supply to consumers. This should reduce the number of problems that consumers encounter but not necessarily improve the way in which complaints are dealt with once they arise.

- Generally, in a misleading advertising case, the objective is to make sellers stop advertising which has been identified as objectionable. If that objective is achieved, ACD diminishes through a reduction in the number of consumers who are affected by the advertising. Again, it is unlikely to impact directly the way in which problems are dealt with
by the company in question but rather to reduce the number of those problems.

Impact of the intervention on other firms in the market

4.24 OFT interventions can have a deterrent effect on non-targeted businesses and prevent infringements of a similar nature from occurring. Potential infringers see a reputational risk and this can act as a powerful deterrent. In addition, publicity or visibility of the intervention may alert other businesses to the fact that certain practices constitute infringements, of which they may have been unaware.

4.25 In most of the cases, we lacked information to make a detailed assessment of the deterrent effect of the intervention on other businesses operating in the market. In general, one expects that deterrence will be stronger for cases that received media attention or had high visibility among a certain group of businesses. This was to some extent the case in the MB Designs and Ryanair interventions. These were the only two cases where we found some evidence of deterrent effects. We suggest that the OFT should consider making interventions more visible to maximise the deterrent effects from interventions.

4.26 The cases of Dabs and BCA stand at the opposite end of the spectrum, with minimal impact on deterrence, even if, in our view, for different reasons. The Dabs intervention focused on their terms and conditions and the reputational cost of unfavourable terms is low compared to a reputation of selling goods of inadequate quality. Consumers may – assuming they read and understand contract terms - gamble with a company offering unfavourable terms for returns if, for example, they perceive their prices to be cheaper. And, of course, as already noted, many consumers simply ignore the small print of contracts.

4.27 In the BCA case, there was little deterrence in related book retailing markets but this perhaps is not surprising given that there are very few companies applying the business ‘book club’ business model. This market has been contracting for a number of years, for reasons that are external to the OFT intervention. However, the intervention may have
had an impact on businesses in other sectors using the ‘club’ business model. ‘Wine clubs’ are an example that has gained some prominence in recent years. Thus, if we look outside the book retailing market, the intervention might have had a deterrent impact on other businesses.

4.28 A general point that can be made about deterrence is that it probably works best where sub-optimal outcomes for consumers involve clear breaches of the law, and enforcement interventions successfully targeted on those breaches cause businesses to incur significant costs. This has not been the case for any of the interventions we studied.

4.29 We note that at the time of these interventions the OFT did not have the powers to fine or otherwise sanction a business to reduce the gains from past infringements. Rather, the OFT powers in relation to its consumer enforcement functions were solely injunctive in nature. If the harmful conduct is profitable, it is unlikely that the anticipation of an OFT intervention of this type will, on its own, deter the company from infringing the law.

4.30 The OFT gained the power to prosecute criminally certain offences under the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 and it is envisaged that the OFT will trial other powers, notably Fixed Monetary Penalties and Discretionary Requirements (including variable monetary penalties) from Autumn 2010 following the passing of the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2009.

4.31 In the interventions described here, therefore, the OFT focused on stopping what is considered to be sub-optimal practices but did not (because it could not) either impose fines or secure compensation for those (if any) who might have been legally entitled to it. Generally, intervention directed solely at stopping business practices may not impose costs on targeted firms other than loss of a reputation. However, it must be borne in mind that heavy penalties are likely only ever to be available in cases involving serious and clear-cut breaches of law that cause legally recoverable loss to numerous consumers. This study makes no assessment of whether such penalties would, hypothetically, have been available in the circumstances of any the six cases studied.
4.32 In those markets where reputation is important and businesses require trust from their customers in order to prosper, the possible publicity of an OFT intervention against the company could have a significant deterrent effect. This seems to have occurred with the Ryanair and the MB Designs interventions. Our interviews highlighted that other firms operating in these or related markets were keen not to gain a reputation for the particular types of infringement which OFT contended arose in these cases.

Quantification of the impacts

4.33 The figure below summarises our estimates of the impact for each of the six interventions in terms of yearly reduction in ACD and the main ways in which that reduction was achieved. The accompanying Annexes provide a full overview of the quantification process for each of the cases.
### Figure 4.2: Quantification of impacts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Estimated size of affected market</th>
<th>Relevant legislation</th>
<th>Estimated OFT costs</th>
<th>Estimated yearly reduction in ACD</th>
<th>Consumers have lower costs / make better choices</th>
<th>Improved consumer confidence: Fewer deterred complaints</th>
<th>Deterrent effect on other businesses</th>
<th>Other benefits from better business conduct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airline pricing</td>
<td>£7.4 billion</td>
<td>CMARs</td>
<td>£310,000</td>
<td>£131 million</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 75</td>
<td>£11 billion</td>
<td>Consumer Credit Act</td>
<td>£1 million</td>
<td>£99 million</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MB Designs</td>
<td>£3 million&lt;sup&gt;43&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Sale of Goods Act, Supply of Goods and Services Act, UTCCRs</td>
<td>£520,000</td>
<td>£10.7 million</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ryanair</td>
<td>£950 million</td>
<td>UTCCRs</td>
<td>£360,000</td>
<td>£1.4 million</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCA</td>
<td>£100 million</td>
<td>CMARs</td>
<td>£210,000</td>
<td>£876,000</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dabs</td>
<td>£200 million</td>
<td>UTCCRs, Distance Selling Regulations</td>
<td>£13,000</td>
<td>£78,000</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td></td>
<td>54%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (£ 000s)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>£2.4 million</td>
<td>£243 million</td>
<td>£185,336</td>
<td>£46,110</td>
<td>£9,004</td>
<td>£2,588</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>42</sup> The figures presented for MB Designs, Ryanair, BCA and Dabs are estimates of yearly company turnover as these interventions were focused on the consumers of the individual companies in question. In contrast, the figures for airline pricing and Section 75 cases relate to the wider market reflecting the fact these interventions reach beyond an individual company. See our introduction section for more details on these estimates. Ryanair’s latest year annual turnover was £2.5 billion but only a fraction of this will be UK passengers (we have assumed 38 per cent based on the 2008 annual report).

<sup>43</sup> We estimate the value of the Scottish market for windows and doors at £462 million in 2007 (8.1 per cent of the UK market estimated on the basis that Scotland represents 8.1 per cent of UK GDP). We estimate a less than 1 per cent market share for MB Designs.
4.34 Figure 4.2 considers four possible mechanisms in which interventions translate into actual benefits for consumers:

- consumers have lower costs/make better choices
- fewer deterred complaints
- the deterrent effect on other businesses
- other benefits arising from better business conduct.

4.35 With the exception of the Section 75 case which was concerned with the clarification of a point of law, all the interventions in our view succeeded in making businesses change prior conduct (as Figure 4.1 highlights). However, the mechanism by which the intervention brings about a benefit to a consumer varies.

4.36 For the six cases examined, the greatest benefit in our analysis comes from ‘consumers having lower costs/making better choices’ (accounting for 76 per cent of overall yearly benefits). Admittedly, this is a broad category but significant nevertheless as it illustrates that interventions succeed the most when they help in reducing costs to consumers of interacting in the market and help consumers make better and more informed choices. This is likely to occur in interventions that affect the way the consumers undertake transactions and make decisions. Rather than assisting consumers when there are problems, these interventions help consumers in preventing problematic situations from arising in the first place.

4.37 The next highest benefit on our analysis comes, rather interestingly, from reduction in deterred complaints (accounting for 19 per cent of overall yearly benefits). The study of the six interventions highlighted a number of reasons why consumers may be deterred from seeking redress when problematic situations occur. When an intervention succeeds in improving consumer awareness of their rights and
confidence in the process of seeking redress, the consumer benefit achieved is significant. However, to fully maximise this benefit, it would require the targeted company to have in place a satisfactory approach to complaint handling.

4.38 The six cases had a smaller impact (less than four per cent of yearly benefits) in terms of deterring similar actions by non-targeted businesses. It is likely that this is attributable to the fact that the OFT had, at the time of the six interventions, no positive rule making powers to improve business conduct. The new powers that the OFT will start trialling in 2010 may have the capacity to bring a significant improvement in these areas.

4.39 The MB Designs intervention has a significantly larger estimated impact than the intervention on Ryanair’s terms and conditions, even though the customer base of Ryanair is in the millions while that of MB Designs is in the thousands. MB Designs is interesting due to the precedent setting nature of the case with implications for deterrence. In the Ryanair case, the change in the terms and conditions was felt by a relatively small number of passengers who reported experiencing a problem, such as having their flight cancelled or losing their bags.

4.40 In the particular cases we analysed, interventions targeting unfavourable terms and conditions had relatively less impact in reducing ACD than those targeting advertising considered to be misleading or Sales of Goods Act (SoGA) cases. This is likely because in the cases in our sample unfavourable terms only manifested themselves when the consumer actually had a specific problem and, the incidence of these specific problems was relatively small, such as lost luggage in the case of Ryanair. Nevertheless, all passengers with luggage incur a risk that if theirs is lost, they may not receive adequate compensation, a factor which affects confidence in the market. There may also be some markets where unfavourable terms have the potential to result in significant ACD
should sufficient consumers be expected to experience the relevant problem.

4.41 On the other hand, generally, misleading advertising and sale of goods of inadequate quality can be expected to affect a large proportion of a seller’s customer base.
5 CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNT

5.1 There are two main ways in which our case study results may inform future thinking. The first is in terms of how to measure the success of similar interventions in future. The second is to consider how the OFT could prioritise its enforcement work to achieve the greatest impact for consumers. This includes looking beyond the interventions to consider how business reactions may affect/nullify the benefits to consumers.

Measuring the success of consumer interventions

5.2 The success of a consumer intervention is primarily measured by the achieved reduction in ACD. A quantification of the initial level of ACD is important when considering interventions. This was not originally available for the cases we looked at in this report. A number of techniques to measure ACD are available to the OFT.

5.3 Information that can be drawn from consumer complaints can have a significant role. The OFT recently carried out a study that comprehensively assesses complaining behaviour of consumers in different markets.44 This analysis can valuably be combined with aggregated complaint information to derive initial estimates of ACD in the various markets.45

5.4 The data recorded by Consumer Direct could be utilised further and may benefit from asking complainants a systematic set of questions,


such as what the value of the transaction was, what percentage of that transaction was affected by the fault/problem and how much time/money the consumer has spent in seeking redress. We recognise that this suggestion might have cost implications for the Consumer Direct business model, which we have not been in a position to consider - our suggestion is on the basis of what we see as potential benefits to the effectiveness of OFT interventions.

5.5 In markets where the population affected is large, a survey may be a cost-effective and timely method to estimate the incidence of particular problems amongst the population. The results of a pre-intervention survey could then be compared with those of a post-intervention survey to help estimate any changes achieved by the intervention.46

Targeting and tailoring enforcement work to achieve high impact outcomes

5.6 Given the discussion above, we conclude with some key points for OFT to consider when prioritising different types of intervention with a view to assisting the OFT in selecting those which are most likely to be cost-effective and achieve high impact.

Actions by targeted businesses post intervention

5.7 In most of the cases studied here, the OFT intervention required targeted businesses to cease certain practices. A pre-condition for success is thus that businesses change their behaviour in line with what is required of them. However, enforcement has to focus on suspected breaches of law, which tend to involve specifically defined

46 This is clearly a simplification. No assessment would ever be quite as straightforward and a number of controls and supporting analysis would have to be included. Changes in a market may be attributable to many factors and the fact that the OFT made an intervention may be only one of several explanatory factors for observed changes.
practices and circumstances which do not necessarily encompass all forms of sub-optimal business behaviour. Narrowly-targeted legal action can sometimes be the catalyst for broader change, but improved business conduct can take many forms and legalistic changes may do little to enhance consumer welfare. Before taking on an intervention, the OFT may want to consider the mechanism through which the intervention is expected to operate. In particular, if post intervention there is a wide range of actions that businesses can take to undo or undermine the effects of the change imposed by the OFT, then the intervention’s success may be a priori compromised.

Impact on consumers

5.8 Even if a good outcome in terms of business conduct is expected, an intervention uses up scarce resources and these should be allocated where ultimately benefits to consumers are greatest. As such, impact is one important consideration before taking on these actions.

5.9 Impact depends on how many consumers will potentially benefit, with what likelihood and by how much. Certain interventions may have little impact because they will only affect consumers in situations that do not occur often. Others have the potential for high impact if they affect large number of consumers in relatively high value day-to-day transactions.

5.10 Some interventions that target unfavourable terms and conditions may affect only a small fraction of consumers because most of the consumers involved will remain unaware of the content of terms and conditions relevant to their contracts unless they face problems with the transaction. In addition, changes to particular wording will typically only affect a fraction of those consumers with problems. Interventions on terms and conditions are therefore more likely to have an effect if they succeed in increasing consumer awareness of their rights and making consumers more confident to participate in the market and to seek redress when facing problems.
5.11 On the basis of the limited sample of cases we examined, interventions targeting infringements that potentially occur more frequently or that potentially affect a very large share of all transactions are likely to have a larger impact on consumers.

Deterrence

5.12 When designing an intervention or considering which markets are most worth tackling, the OFT should put some weight on the potential deterrent effect that an intervention can have. An intervention that is successful in deterring similar infringements is more cost effective as it achieves greater impact on consumers, while saving enforcement resources going forward.

5.13 There are two main ways in which an intervention can deter other similar infringements: through adverse reputational effects and through anticipation of [high] financial penalties which would remove/reduce the gains from infringements.47

5.14 Deterrence is generally associated with interventions that are highly publicised and cause embarrassment to targeted businesses. It is more likely to occur in markets where firms’ reputation is important and where consumers actively choose which firms to deal with.

5.15 Under the powers available to it at the time of these six interventions, the OFT did not have the option of imposing high fines on infringing businesses. No judgment is made or implied here that such fines or compensation remedies could appropriately have been invoked in any of the cases considered. Cases suitable for the use of such powers would be ones involving clear-cut and serious malpractice by large businesses, and actual financial loss or other

47 Criminalisation is a third one, forming part of OFT’s enforcement policy where activity borders on being criminal, for instance when dealing with rogue traders such as scammers.
quantifiable harm (rather than, for instance, psychological detriment) for large numbers of consumers. However, it is nonetheless reasonable to suppose that financial penalties and compensation to injured parties can play a significant role in future enforcement under the OFT’s new powers. In the right circumstances, the anticipation of high financial costs can be an effective deterrent to potential infringers. A few exemplary cases of the kind just described could thus be a very good use of enforcement resources for the OFT.

Considering and fine tuning alternative intervention tools

5.16 With new powers on the horizon, the OFT can consider a range of interventions and collect different types of information about the likely effectiveness of the alternatives. A consumer survey performed prior to the intervention could, for example, ask consumers how they might react to different types of remedies (while noting that hypothetical questions have to be carefully framed to maximise reliability of answers). In this regard, in addition to surveys, there are a number of other methods that could be considered to ‘road test’ remedies, to assist the OFT in choosing among alternative remedies/interventions and to fine-tune the selected ones for maximum effectiveness.

5.17 Sometimes in consumer enforcement work urgent action is needed to protect specific consumers from immediate loss or harm. We do not suggest that consumer surveys should be undertaken in such cases, but rather before intervention which is aimed at improving general consumer welfare in the longer term. The case for undertaking some form of preliminary investigation before the latter kind of intervention will be the stronger if, as is perhaps to be expected, any future powers to impose heavy fines and penalties are relevant mainly in cases requiring urgent action. If that is so, and OFT remains able to

use only tools with less deterrent effect when taking action to benefit consumers generally - as opposed to giving immediate protection to victims of gross malpractice - then the need for careful targeting of such action will be correspondingly greater.